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Abstract. Industrial Control Systems (ICS) play a critical role in controlling in-
dustrial processes. Wide use of modern IT technologies enables cyber attacks to
disrupt the operation of ICS. Advanced Persistent Threats (APT) are the most
threatening attacks to ICS due to their long persistence and destructive cyber-
physical effects to ICS. This paper considers a simulation of attackers and de-
fenders of an ICS, where the defender must consider the cost-effectiveness of
implementing defensive measures within the system in order to create an optimal
defense. The aim is to identify the appropriate deployment of a specific defensive
strategy, such as defense-in-depth or critical component defense. The problem
is represented as a strategic competitive optimisation problem, which is solved
using a co-evolutionary particle swarm optimisation algorithm. Through the de-
velopment of optimal defense strategy, it is possible to identify when each specific
defensive strategies is most appropriate; where the optimal defensive strategy de-
pends on the resources available and the relative effectiveness of those resources.
1 Introduction
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are typically comprised of a set of supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to control field actuators by monitoring the data
of industrial processes. ICS can be found in various sectors of critical infrastructure.
Disruption to such systems would lead to disastrous damage to the plants, environment
and human health [26]. To promote efficient communication and high throughput, mod-
ern ICT technologies have been widely adopted into ICS, which makes them vulnera-
ble targets for cyber criminals. ICS-CERT received 245 reports in 2014 by trusted asset
owners, whilst there are still numerous incidents in critical infrastructure unreported 1.
Amongst the various cyber attacks against ICS, multi-stage Advanced Persistent
Threats (APT) account for roughly 55% 1, and these are also the most threatening
ones due to their long undetected persistence, sophisticated capabilities and destructive
cyber-physical effects to ICS. We show a typical ICS architecture adapted from [26]
in Fig. 1(a). In an APT attack, the attackers initially gain access to the target network,
then propagate through the network by continuously exploiting chains of vulnerabilities
of hosts, and eventually compromise operational field devices. A canonical example of
1 ICS-CERT: Sep. 2014 - Feb. 2015. www.ics-cert.us-cert.gov/monitors/ICS-
MM201502
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Fig. 1: (a) Typical ICS architecture threatened by APT attacks; (b)Simulation
such an attack is Stuxnet [6] acknowledged in 2010, which enabled cyber attacks to
sabotage industrial plants. Stuxnet was introduced to the network by a removable flash
drive, and propagated malware through the corporate and control network by exploit-
ing zero-day vulnerabilities of hosts. Stuxnet eventually tampered the program control-
ling the field PLCs and disrupted the operation of ICS. According to the report [6] by
Symantec, there were approximately 100,000 infected hosts across over 155 countries
by September 2010. Another more recent example was reported by the German gov-
ernment2 in December 2014. A cyber attack breached a steel mill through penetrating
spear-phishing emails and resulted in massive damage to the whole plant.
In the wake of the increasing cyber attacks against ICS, the notion of Defense-in-
Depth has been highly recommended as the best practice to protect critical infrastruc-
tures by numerous reports [26,15]. Defense-in-depth provides a multi-layer protection
involving different security mechanisms such as a vulnerability management system,
advanced firewalls with DMZ, intrusion detection, security awareness training and inci-
dent response. However, the high financial and managerial cost make defense-in-depth
impractical and hard to fully implement [24]. Massive unnecessary efforts have been
wasted on irrelevant attack vectors. Particularly smaller companies still struggle with
finding the most cost-efficient way to deploy available controls. For this reason we look
for alternative defensive strategies, and the most optimal implementation of them.
Most of the techniques involved at each stage of an APT can generally be defended
by conventional security controls. A key question is how to allocate defensive resources
and budget across the system to establish an effective protection against APT. In par-
ticular with limited low budget, our work here produces decision support tools to find
optimal defense strategies, such as system-wide evenly spreading defense (i.e. Defense-
in-depth) and focused defense on critical components. Unlike conventional analysis, we
novelly consider the impact of varied cost-effectiveness models of investments on decid-
ing the most optimal defensive strategies, making the work more realistic and practical.
We use the notion of attacker to represent potential cyber attackers, and defender
for the security manager who needs to deploy controls to protect an ICS. An attack
graph is automatically generated by our logic-based reasoning engine, which chains
various weaknesses of a given network that can be exploited by attackers. We model
2 SANS ICS Defense Use Case, 2014. https://ics.sans.org/media/ICS-CPPE-
case-Study-2-German-Steelworks_Facility.pdf
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the attacker and defender as a pair of competing agents and investigate their behaviours
in a co-evolutionary process. Particle Swarm Optimisation (PSO) [12] is adopted to aid
agents in finding the most optimal strategy to attack and defend under different circum-
stances. From this work, we discover that with limited low budget, the defensive effort
should be generally focused on the critical targets rather than spreading over the system.
However, when defending the critical assets becomes very inefficient, the most optimal
strategies then favour defending other less valuable assets to form a defense-in-depth
style strategy. The paper starts with a related work section where the work on attack
modelling and agent-based co-evolutionary approaches are presented. The approach
proposed in this paper is discussed in Section 3, which describes the modelling of the
key elements and the development of the agent-based simulation. Three case studies
extracted from the CSSP Recommended Defense-In-Depth Architecture [15] are de-
scribed in Section 4 to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed tools. Relevant
results are presented in Section 5 and discussed in Section 6. The paper concludes with
a summary and discussion of further directions of research in Section 7.
2 Related Work
A comprehensive introduction to the security issues of ICS is given in [26]. The gener-
ation of attack graphs has been studied extensively in the security community, and two
of the most influential generators are MulVal [20] and NetSPA[17], both of which pro-
vide automatic generation of complete attack paths from scanned CVE vulnerabilities.
[17] further provides a way of abstracting attack paths by classifying vulnerabilities in
terms of CVE factors. Attack graphs have been widely applied to risk analysis. Noel
et al. [19] measure the overall security of a network by simulating the propagation of
multi-stage attacks and likelihoods of each single attack. Ma and Smith[18] provide a
risk analysis for critical infrastructures to understand the impact of inter-dependency
of CVE vulnerabilities on forming multi-step attack chains. This work particularly fo-
cuses on CVE vulnerabilities with effects of code execution and elevation of privileges
as these vulnerabilities can serve as stepping-stone nodes to induce further attacks. In
this paper, we generate attack graphs by common weaknesses of ICS, rather than spe-
cific vulnerabilities on each host. In this way, we lift our focus of defense to a more
generic class of attacks, producing a more global view of deploying defense controls.
Antoine Lemay’s 2013 thesis[16] presents an approach to defending SCADA com-
ponents in electrical grids from APT style attacks. The author presents an Intrusion
Detection System to protect ICS, with the aim of preventing the attacker from develop-
ing appropriate tools for exploiting the system. A more detailed view of the threats from
APT models has been performed by Chopitea[2], and in a game theoretic manner by
Pham and Cid[21]. One area of study that is of importance to this work is the concept of
network hardening, which has been approached by studying vulnerabilities through at-
tack graphs[28]. By studying the structure of networks and the vulnerabilities required
to effectively exploit system, it is possible to identify the key areas where defensive
measures are most effective, an approach that is taken in the representation of the prob-
lem in this work. Work undertaken by Fielder et. al.[7] uses a game theoretic approach
to the optimal allocation of system administrator time to defensive tasks. The results
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show that a greater emphasis of the limited administrator time should be placed on the
most valuable assets, consistent with a critical component defense strategy. Extensive
game theoretic work has been performed by Tambe and Kiekintveld looking at opti-
mal security decisions for real-world scenarios using Stackelberg games. The work has
covered scheduling of airport security[14], allocation of air marshals to flight paths[27]
and border control[13]. The work has moved into cyber security, with a study of the
use of honeypots[4]. While the origins of PSO was proposed by Kennedy and Eberhart
in 1995 [5], a more up to date view of the field of PSO algorithms was presented by
Poli, Kennedy and Blackwell in 2007 [23], which brought together many of the con-
cepts developed over the previous 12 years. This overview was followed in a 2008 study
by Poli [22], which identifies the application areas for PSO. This study identifies that
very little work has gone into applying PSO algorithms to network security tasks, with
only 1.3% of the literature covering the whole security field with some work in security
predictions [9], intrusion detection [25] and authentication [11].
3 Modelling and Simulation
The key components of the system are depicted in Fig.1(b). We define Attacker Profile
and Defender profile to characterise attackers and defenders’ behaviours and generate
attack and defense strategies respectively. Attack strategies are decided by the attack-
ing goals, available resources of the attacker and possible attack paths to launch and
deploy the attack. Given an established network and weaknesses in the network, attack
paths are generated by an automatic reasoning engine using Answer Set Programming
(ASP) [10], which works similarly as most existing attack path generators [20][17].
For defenders, defensive preference of assets and available resource are the key to the
decision making, as well as a set of control pairs defining the behaviours to form de-
fense strategies. The most important part of the system is the agent-based simulation, as
shown in Fig.1(b). Attackers and defenders are modelled as a pair of competing agents,
by which their behaviours are able to co-evolve to develop an optimal solution. PSO is
adopted to encode each candidate strategy as a particle of a swarm and all such particles
gradually move towards the best solution during each iteration of evolution.
3.1 Modelling and Representation
In this section, we introduce the representation of the pair of competing agents – Attack-
ers and Defenders, and other key components to establish the agent-based simulation.
We first represent a typical ICS architecture as a network graph, where each host or
asset is identified as a target node ti ∈ T , a valid connection between a pair of targets
is an edge e ∈ E and E := T × T . A compromised target produces certain gains for
attackers Ia : T → Z+, while causing certain damages for defenders Id : T → Z−.
A sequence of single-step attacks constitutes an effective APT attack, and each single
attack exploits a weakness of a targeted host. We define all such weaknesses as a set
of attack methodsM = {m1, . . . ,mn}. An attack path p is derived by attaching an
applicable attack method m to an edge, indicating a possible way to progress the attack
from one target to another. O(ti) has all outbound paths from ti. Our reasoning engine
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can generate all such possible attack paths for a given network, which altogether render
an attack graph. An example of such attack graph is given in Fig2(a). At each step of
an APT, attackers probabilistically select an outbound attack path to exploit next.
Definition 1. An attacker strategy a := {(O(t1), Ψ1), . . . , (O(tn), Ψn)}, where
– O(ti) = [p1i , . . . , pki ], all outbound paths from the target ti.
– Ψi = {ψ1, . . . ψk}, the probability distribution over O(ti),
∑k
j=1 ψj = 1, ψj > 0.
The key task of defenders is to find a way of deploying defense controls with certain
effectiveness to specifically combat APT-style attacks. Implementing a control with
higher effectiveness generally requires more investment. Here we define “budget” as
a general term of available resources to implement a defense control, such as system
administrators’ time [7], financial cost and other indirect cost [8]. We also define a cost-
effectiveness function in the general form of efft(x) =
ax
bx+c to compute the resulting
effectiveness of a control at the target t with certain investment x, where a, b, c ∈ N,
ax < bx + c. The function will be instantiated to represent various cost-efficiencies in
the examples later. Given a limited budget B, defenders need to decide the most cost-
efficient way to deploy controls. Unlike attackers who have specific targets to stage
attacks, defenders have to protect various targets across the network from numerous
possible attacks and also stop the formation of APT.
Definition 2. A defender strategy d := {(c1, x1), . . . , (cm, xm)} is a set of control
pairs amongst the available controls C = {c1, . . . , cm}, and xi denotes the number
of allocated budget units to implement ci, and
∑m
i=1 xi 6 B, where B is the budget
limit. The effectiveness of ci implemented at the target t is then decided by a provided
cost-effectiveness function efft(xi).
3.2 Simulation
We represent the problem of the calculation of optimal strategies as a competitive co-
evolutionary process between an attacker and a defender. In this way we represent the
problem as a system with two competing agents that aim to optimise their expected pay-
offs from either attacking or defending the system. In order to solve the co-evolutionary
optimisation problem, we have developed a PSO algorithm. The PSO operates a num-
ber of rounds, where the attacker and defender attempt to create best response strategies
to each other’s actions. The PSO method creates an initial set of randomised strategies,
called particles, for the attacker and the defender. The PSO algorithm explores the space
of possible solutions by moving the particles to new positions in the search space aiming
to find better solutions; this is done by applying a movement parameter to the particle,
called a velocity. The velocity of a particle is a special form of the mixed strategy of
the defender and the attacker, where the sum of all components must equal zero. Each
of the particles must be evaluated to assess its performance; this is done by simulating
the interactions between the two players. Considering the nature of the kinds of attacks
expected, the simulation represents the interactions of the players over a given fixed
number of time steps. During each time step, the players have to make a series of deci-
sions with regards to the actions that they perform, where the outcome of those actions
are scored according to the amount of damage that successful attacks cause.
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For each evaluation of the defense strategy, the defender sets a defense based on the
mixed strategy, to prevent damage from an attacker who attempts to breach that defense
over a period of time. At the start of each evaluation, the defender assigns the whole of
the available budget to the system, where each target is assigned a portion of the budget
based on the distribution defined by the strategy. The amount of units assigned to each
control is an amount of budget used to protect the resource, with the effectiveness of
the defensive measures based on the amount invested in defending them.
An attacker attacks through the system, starting from the node labelled EXT and
attempts to advance through the network exploiting subsequent nodes until they have
exploited a vulnerability on a device with no further connections in the network or
the attack is halted by the defender. Specifically, the attacker selects an outward path
from the current node based on their strategy and attempts to exploit a vulnerability
on the connected node. If there is no defense assigned, then the attack is successful,
however, if the defender has assigned defense to the node, then the attacker will exploit
the vulnerability with probability pa > efft(v), where pa is distributed uniformly to
represent the probability a generic attacker is able to successfully launch an attack. More
advanced attacker models will be explored in the future. efft(v) is the effectiveness of
the defensive controls on node n, with an investment of v units from the budget.
If the attacker is successful in exploiting a vulnerability, then they continue to attack
selecting a further connecting node deeper in the system. In the event that there are no
further outward connections, or the attack is halted by the defensive controls, then the
attacker receives the maximum reward of the nodes exploited in the attack and the
defender suffers damage in line with the value of that node.
4 Case Study and Experimental Settings
The case study is adapted from the common ICS architecture in [15][26] and shown
in Fig. 2(a). It is a typical three-zone architecture of ICS, with a Corporate Network,
a Control Network and Field Devices. The node EXT represents the external environ-
ment. Four target nodes represent common hosts in a corporate network and a control
network respectively. The node PLC symbolises the key control device. We collect a set
of attack methods (Fig. 2(b)) from the ICS Top 10 Threats and Countermeasures [1] and
Common Cybersecurity Vulnerabilities in ICS [3]. A set of controls is given in Fig. 2(c),
derived from [1][15]. The attack methods countered by the controls are enumerated in
the rightmost column of Fig. 2(c). An attack graph for the case study is then automat-
ically generated by our ASP engine in Fig. 2(a). Each edge denotes a possible exploit
of the system. The control stations (ctRWs and ctWs) have direct access to PLCs, and
thus all attacks aiming to PLCs have to pass through them. These control workstations
are not connected to any untrusted network, but can be infected by other hosts in the
same network such as ctHmi and ctHist. Remote workstations (ctRWs ) used for remote
maintenance are threatened by the viruses infected by other external assets.
The cost-effectiveness functions are designed to represent a diminishing return on
investment in the security of a device. Given the nature of security, the effectiveness of
any control is restricted to eff(v) < 100%. The implementation of the cost functions
represents that as more effort is put into a control, the effectiveness of the defense that
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(a)
Attack Attack Description  Attack Attack Description  
priM1 Internet Malware subM2 Authentication Bypass   
priM2 Removable Drive  Malware subM3 Removable Drive  Malware 
priM3 Social engineering subM4 Abuse of Access Authority
priM4 Malicious Remote Access subM5 LAN-based injection
priM5 Cross-site Scripting finM1 Buffer overflow 
subM1 SQL Command injection finM2 Man-in-the-middle
(b)
Control Control Descriptions Attack Methods Defended
c1 Removable media checked before use priM2 
c2 Employees security training priM3
c3 Fine-grained remote access priM4
c4 Anti-virus Software priM1,  priM2,  subM5
c5 DMZ and Firewalls priM1, priM4,subM2,subM4, finM1, finM2
c6 Network data validation & integrity check priM5, subM1,subM3,  finM1,  finM2
c7 Fine-grained access controls priM4,  subM2, subM4 
(c)
Corporate Control Field
Fig. 2: Case study on ICS security management: (a) an attack graph; (b) Common ICS
attack methods; (c) Common defense controls.
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Fig. 3: (a) Case Study Settings; (b) Cost-effectiveness functions of investments
control gives is increased. At the same time the rate at which the defense is improved is
reduced. This is represented by the notion, that the first unit of cost introduces a control
and has the largest impact on defense, but spending the same amount on the control
again to either maintain or upgrade will not have the same impact. This is then logi-
cally extended to all future iterations of an increase in budget, where these diminishing
increments are best represented by a form of sigmoid function. Brief introductions to
the three cases are given in Fig.3(a). The main differences amongst the three cases are
the application of cost-effectiveness functions for different zones, where effcp denotes
the function adopted for all targets in the Corporate Zone, effct for the Control Zone
and effd for the Field Zone. Case 1 presents a standard ICS [26] with unique charac-
teristics in each zone, and thus variable functions are applied. An example of such ICS
is Distributed Control Systems (DCS) that has high requirements on timeliness, avail-
ability and limited resource, making the defensive efforts in control and field layer less
efficient. Unlike Case 1, Case 2 provides a comparative scenario where most assets are
located in commercial facilities with particular emphasis on gathering data by SCADA
and hence a uniform function is adopted for all zones. The last case captures a special
scenario of Case 1, where most control devices can be hardly protected (e.g. isolated or
remote distributed ICS) and massive effort is required to deploy controls in Field Zone.
To run the simulations, we fixed a number of parameters that relate to the operation
of the PSO Algorithm. The size of the swarm used was set at 100, which was large
enough to reasonably represent the search space. This is given that the simulation hap-
pens over 50 moves per particle and for 50 generations of competition between the two
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Fig. 4: Average Expected System Damage against the available defense budget
agents. The weighting values for all factors contributing to the velocity were set at 0.05,
this was set so as to allow for better exploration of the strategy space, by not favouring
a single component. The simulation operated over 20 time steps for the attacker and de-
fender strategies and a particle would be evaluated 30 times to reduce variance from the
non-deterministic nature of the simulated environment. In the next section, we show the
simulation results on the optimal defense for all three cases. We analyse the variance of
the average expected damage per attack in Fig.4and discuss the resource assignment on
the critical component PLC in Fig.5.
5 Results
Fig. 4 shows the average expected damage per attack from an indifferent attacker with
the three cost-effectiveness models for defense. The most noticeable result is the dif-
ference in expected damage between the uniform cost-effectiveness and both forms of
the scaled cost-effectiveness. At low budget levels the difference in expected damage
between the uniform and scaled methods is approximately 300. With more than 6 units
of defense, this difference is reduced to an approximate range of 150-200. This reduc-
tion in difference is representative in a change in policy, where the defender switches
from a heavier focus on protecting the PLC to performing a defense-in-depth strategy.
By operating a similar strategy to those with the scaled cost-effectiveness model, the
difference in expected damage becomes equivalent to the difference in the efficiency.
With the uniform cost-effectiveness, we see that the first 5 units provide the most ben-
efit of defense. The first unit reduces the damage by approximately 450 units, with the
next 4 units reducing the damage by an average of 84 each. After 5 units, the average
net gain in defense is reduced to 10 damage per unit. In contrast, for the scaled meth-
ods, the first unit for defense has a lower benefit, providing only a reduction in average
expected damage by approximately 110. For the scaled model the next 4 units have a
similar impact on the defense as the uniform model, reducing the expected damage by
an average of 86 each, however this reduction is only 65 for the low cost-effectiveness
model. However each unit of defense after the fifth, reduces the expected damage by 24
for the normal scaled and 28 for the scaled with low cost-effectiveness.
We see this change in the reduction of damage, because the effectiveness of the de-
fense per unit placed on a single target is lower for every unit after the first. This means
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that after an initial investment to protect an asset, each further investment has a lower
impact. For the uniform model, the initial investment of a single unit to protect the PLC
is the most significant investment, with the next 4 units able to help protect the rest of
the system. Beyond this point each additional unit is used to protect a less risky compo-
nent or add defense to an already defended component. For the scaled methods, this is
not as consistent, since the first unit has a lower initial impact outside the assets at the
corporate level. To identify the issue surrounding the type of defense that accounts for
the optimal solutions, we need to identify the strategy of defense for the critical com-
ponent, in this case the PLC. The graph presented in Fig. 5, shows the representation of
the probability of defending PLC in the optimal solution across each of the runs.
The uniform cost-effectiveness method shows that the first unit of defense is almost
always placed on the PLC, since there is no strategy that better defends the system. As
the number of units increases, the probability of placing defense on the PLC decreases,
but maintains the probability that at least 1 unit should be dedicated to the PLC. From 7
units, the defense tends towards a preference of defense-in-depth, with only 30% of the
budget being allocated for the PLC. The remaining 70% budget is then split amongst all
other controls, with an emphasis on the control layer. It is because with a larger budget
available, it is no longer efficient to focus all the defense on the PLC, but instead spread
the defense to limit not only the damage to the PLC, but protect more of the network.
ctWs ctRWs ctHist cpDB cpEmail PLC ctHmi cpWs cpServer
0.320 0.008 0.634 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.007
0.009 0.104 0.011 0.007 0.009 0.306 0.007 0.541 0.007
Table 1: Comparison of Strategies with a Scaled Cost-effectiveness and a Budget of 2
Unlike the uniform model, the scaled models initially reject placing the very lim-
ited resource in a place where it has the lower potential impact, which is at the PLC,
favouring a more aggressive defense that has a higher variance. However, we see that
as the budget increases, the ability to cover the PLC with some effectiveness is greatly
increased, and so the scaled models adapt to this and assign resources accordingly. The
low cost-effectiveness scaled model assigns on average 13% less resources to the PLC
than the standard scaled model, this is due to the lower impact that each unit has when
applied to the node, with the initial uptake of non-incidental protection for the PLC oc-
curring later. While the results may show that in general the optimal strategy for each
of the cost-effectiveness strategic tested converges to 0.175 < xPLC < 0.25 with a
larger budget, the variance in those results indicates that there are a number of optimal
strategies. It is accounted for in the high variance of the results associated with the im-
plementation of defense on the PLC. We compare two different solutions in Table 1,
which shows two competing strategies for the defender getting the same approximate
outcome of 765. In one case minimal emphasis is placed on the PLC, whereas the other
strategy implements defense at the PLC with a probability of 0.306 per unit of defense.
6 Discussion
One of the issues is what happens if the decision maker gets the cost-effectiveness
model wrong. When defining the optimal defense, the cost-effectiveness model dictates
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Fig. 5: Probability per unit assigned to PLC against the available budget
how much effort should be placed onto any individual asset and so overestimating the
cost-effectiveness could prove disastrous. An overestimation could create a scenario
where the defender believes they have one cost-effectiveness model, but in reality they
are operating under a different model. From the perspective of the results presented
in Fig.4, that for a budget of 4, the average expected damage for a uniform model
is approximately 305, with the scaled cost-effectiveness only able to offer the same
defense with a budget of 12. This means that in order to get the same coverage that
was believed at a budget of 4, the defender would have to invest 3 times the amount.
Additionally if the defender were to implement an optimal strategy from the uniform
cost-effectiveness with a scaled cost-effectiveness model, the average expected damage
would increase to 639, which is in the same range as the optimal strategy for the same
budget under the correct cost-effectiveness model. However, we see that there is a 109%
increase in damage from the expected damage using the uniform model.
While we have considered the impact of not as strongly defending the PLCs through
a reduction in cost-effectiveness, the results show that the defender should still place
some emphasis on the PLC. However we know that there are some systems that have
very restricted operational capacity, mainly concerning field controllers. To represent
this within the model, we ran a special case of the variable cost-effectiveness, where
the cost-effectiveness was set at xx+14 . With this low cost-effectiveness, we see that the
emphasis on protecting the PLC at high levels has an average probability of 0.08, where
the emphasis of the defense is split across the rest of the devices with a higher emphasis
placed on those in the the more valuable control layer.
7 Conclusions
In this work, we have developed a model studying the cost-effectiveness of investments
for defending components on a network. The model simulates an attacker attempting
to breach a system against a probabilistic defense assignment of the defender. Using a
particle swarm optimisation algorithm to simulate the behaviour of two agents, we have
been able to identify the optimal strategy of a system defender in an ICS environment.
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The results show that as the cost-effectiveness of protecting the most vulnerable node
in a network decreases, the uptake of defense-in-depth style defenses increases.
To extend this work, we want to better represent the resources and decision making
of the attacker. In this current model, we focus on the defender and the defense deci-
sions, but in an APT style attack, the attacker is a more active player than currently con-
sidered. The attacker needs to better consider the paths and methods of defense utilised,
where exploring the system is an action that is constrained by time. To represent this
a proposed extension would be to view the transitions between nodes as an event that
occurs over time, creating a scenario, where the attacker must balance attacking the
quickest paths against the defender’s optimal strategy. .
The biggest issue for further study is the real world applicability of the model. At
this stage the model has been focussed on the possibilities within a generic architecture.
This limits the usefulness of the outputs, since it is difficult to define if the strategies are
true to an actual system, as they are dependent on the cost functions and the rewards. By
extending the study to consider a real case, we are able to better implement the payoffs
and cost-effectiveness functions, raising the reliability of the results and the advice.
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